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Abstract: Malingering is a form of deception in which one fakes illness to earn (positive or negative) reinforcement. The 
purpose of the current research was to explore the ability of naïve participants to malinger distress on a clinical, projective 
measure (Draw-A-Person; DAP). In two experiments, individuals first drew figures of a man, woman, and self. Then, they 
imagined they were in a motor vehicle accident and drew the figures again as if they were falsely claiming distress from 
the accident. In Experiment 1, 65 undergraduates participated and in Experiment 2, 70 undergraduates and 40 high school 
students participated. The drawings were objectively scored using a standardized protocol and ‘honest’ and ‘malingered’ 
drawings were compared. In both Experiments, participants successfully malingered distress and did so by drawing more 
“primitively”, earning lower cognitive ability scores on their malingered drawings. Hence, objectively-scored DAP tasks 
are vulnerable to deliberate distortion by naïve individuals, though malingering detection may be possible in the future via 
cognitive skill scores. However, reliance on DAP tasks for diagnostic or forensic purposes currently seems questionable.  
Keywords: Deception, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), trauma, cognitive ability, projective tests. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Most individuals are well practiced in deliberate distor-
tion. In fact, whether it is telling little white lies or whoppers, 
most children are competent liars by the time they reach ado-
lescence (Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988; Quinn, 1988; Tal-
war & Lee, 2002a, b; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003). They 
can be very successful when lying to their parents, for exam-
ple, with only 5% of the adolescents in one study reporting 
that they were often caught (Knox, Zusman, McGinty, & 
Gescheidler, 2001). They successfully lie to trained profes-
sionals, as well. Faust, Hart, Guilmette and Arkes (1988) 
found that three adolescents (ages 15-17 years) with minimal 
instruction were able to fake brain damage on neuropsy-
chological assessments, such that none of the 64 neuropsy-
chologists who participated detected the deception. These 
findings were replicated with three 9- to 12-year-old children 
(Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988). Hence, skill in deception 
of various sorts is acquired before adolescence.  
 Despite the frequency of lying throughout normal devel-
opment (DePaulo et al., 2003; Knox et al., 2001; Wilson et 
al., 2003), it is not clear how adolescents and even adults 
understand and commit deception in different contexts, par-
ticularly those that might be forensically relevant (Carmody 
& Crossman, 2005). Hence, the first objective of the present 
research was to explore deception in a relatively novel con-
text, that of feigning a serious psychological impairment 
(i.e., emotional disturbance). The context was an imagined 
motor vehicle accident, after which subjects were to claim  
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emotional distress to gain a large sum of money. Such cases 
can involve forensic psychologists as experts, raising the 
controversial issue of credibility assessment and how it can 
be accurately accomplished. Yet, the issue is relevant in ad-
ditional contexts, as well. That is, in some treatment-oriented 
settings, individuals may over-report or exaggerate symp-
toms of poor cognitive or emotional functioning (Kropp & 
Rogers, 1992; McCann, 1998). As a consequence, there is a 
growing need to apply reliable, valid, and practical methods 
for assessing deception among clients and patients, some of 
whom are adolescents and young adults. Hence, the second 
objective of the current research was to explore the vulner-
ability of one projective test, the Draw-A-Person test, to par-
ticipants’ feigning of emotional disturbance. 
Human Figure Drawing 
 Human figure drawing is a performance-based clinical 
procedure in which an individual is asked to draw human 
figures, and these drawings are then analyzed. Although the 
procedure has gone through different permutations with dif-
ferent names, Draw-A-Person (DAP) task is a generic term 
for the general procedure, and is the term that will be used 
here. As with other projective and performance-based 
evaluation tools, the validity of DAP tasks is debated and 
attempts to validate the task have led to the evolution of 
various procedures and scoring systems for DAP tests, some 
of which are more objective than others (e.g., see Handler, 
1984; Sims, Dana, & Bolton, 1983). Among these systems, it 
appears that procedures emphasizing global quantitative 
drawing scores (rather than seeking specific ‘signs’ of pa-
thology, such as oversized eyes) are the least problematic 
and most promising, in terms of validity (Lilienfeld, Wood, 
& Garb, 2000; Riethmiller & Handler, 1997). 
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 Clinically speaking, human figure drawing is considered 
to be a relatively non-threatening, nonverbal method for be-
ginning counseling situations (Lev-Wiesel & Hershkovitz, 
2000; Riethmiller & Handler, 1997) and, as a consequence, 
has been used in a variety of settings including prisons, 
schools, counseling centers and in several cultures. DAP 
tests are used routinely in educational, psychological, and 
forensic settings with adults and children with learning, be-
havioral, and developmental problems (Camara, Nathan, & 
Puente, 2000; Dykens, 1996). In fact, due to the flexibility of 
the task, DAP tests have been used in assessments of emo-
tional disturbance, gender identity, cognitive delay, trauma, 
sexual abuse, and even violently aggressive behavior in pris-
oners, among others (Aldridge et al., 2004; Lev-Wiesel & 
Hershkovitz, 2000; Ochoa, Riccio, Jimenez, de Alba & Si-
nes, 2005; Tharinger & Stark, 1990). Moreover, while hu-
man figure drawing is frequently used in clinical settings for 
assessment (e.g., custody evaluations, Ackerman & Schoen-
dorf, 1992; Bricklin, 1984), it also has been used in therapy 
with children (Burgess & Hartman, 1993; Peterson, Hardin, 
& Nitsch, 1995; Wilson & Ratekin, 1990). 
Malingering PTSD on a Projective Test 
 Serious concerns have been raised about the validity and 
reliability of the DAP method (Lilienfeld et al., 2000; Smith 
& Dumont, 1995). Critiques include insufficient training of 
clinicians using the method (Smith & Dumont, 1995), reli-
ance on unsubstantiated ‘signs’ in drawings as indices of 
pathology, and redundancy with other, more valid and mean-
ingful measures, such as IQ measures (Lally, 2001; Lilien-
feld et al., 2000). Moreover, additional research indicates 
that some children can be vulnerable to suggestion when 
their drawings are used to probe memory (Bruck, Melnyk, & 
Ceci, 2000; Strange, Garry, & Sutherland, 2003). 
 Yet, beyond questions of task validity and patient vulner-
ability is the issue of deliberate distortion on the task. It is 
possible for individuals to deliberately misrepresent them-
selves in assessment settings, perhaps for their own gain. 
Specifically, malingering occurs when one fakes or exagger-
ates an illness or disability to gain a reward or avoid a nega-
tive outcome. It has been suggested that some forensic set-
tings (e.g., litigation) encourage symptom exaggeration, at a 
minimum (Blanchard & Hickling, 1997). Malingering is 
thought to be common among personal injury litigants seek-
ing compensation, with estimates of the incidence of malin-
gering post-injury psychological symptoms ranging from 1 
to over 50% (Resnick, 1997). Hence, standardized instru-
ments are increasingly being used in litigation contexts, per-
haps due to their objectivity and the fact that many include 
empirically tested scales for detecting biased response pat-
terns (Berry, 1995; Guriel et al., 2004). 
 Given the widespread use of DAP testing, one might ask 
how vulnerable such tests are to malingering, even when a 
standardized scoring system is used, as pathological respond-
ing on projective testing has been found to be ‘fakable’ 
(Rogers, 2008; Schretlen, 1997). In particular, in forensic 
cases where PTSD is at issue, psychological opinion might 
be requested in court. To the extent that such opinion rests 
on projective testing, it is problematic. At present, the most 
commonly used methods for interpreting human figure draw-
ings fall short of meeting the Daubert standard for admissi-
bility in court (Lally, 2001). Moreover, human figure draw-
ing methods do not meet most of Heilbrun’s (1992) guide-
lines for use in forensic assessment, although reliance on 
overall rating scales appears to minimally meet these stan-
dards (Lally, 2001). An objective rating procedure (i.e., the 
DAP: SPED, see below) and its overall rating scale at least 
partially meet a number of guidelines and criteria, with the 
potential to meet more of the guidelines, if additional re-
search is conducted (Lally, 2001; see also Lilienfeld et al., 
2000). 
Objective Scoring 
 Clinical use of DAP procedures is common, although it is 
not clear that such use is warranted or appropriate (Dykens, 
1996; Matto, 2002; Smith & Dumont, 1995). Historic reli-
ance on specific ‘signs’ in the interpretation of drawings is 
not generally supported by the empirical literature (Lally, 
2001; Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Recent efforts to standardize 
evaluation of the projective DAP tasks have resulted in ob-
jective scoring systems by Naglieri and colleagues (Naglieri, 
1988; Naglieri, McNeish, & Bardos, 1991), which provide 
cognitive and emotional disturbance scores from drawings. 
Aggregating scores across components within the scoring 
systems arguably provides the greatest advantage to using 
the objective scoring (Riethmiller & Handler, 1997). 
 The Naglieri scoring systems have been used to evaluate 
the cognitive scores (Naglieri, 1988) and emotional distur-
bance scores (Naglieri et al., 1991) of a group of adolescents 
and adults with mental retardation. Researchers found mod-
est correlations between DAP cognitive scores and vocabu-
lary (r = .34) and matrices (r = .41) scores on the Kaufman 
Brief Intelligence Test, and an association was found be-
tween emotional disturbance scores and social adaptation 
from the Vineland (r = .36; Dykens, 1996).  
 Questions remain, however, as to the extent to which 
these standardized scoring systems are vulnerable to deliber-
ate distortion by adolescents (e.g., Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Of 
primary concern is the vulnerability of the objectively scored 
Draw-A-Person task to malingering, which has yet to be 
tested. Hence, the current experiments examined whether 
Naglieri’s objective scoring systems might be of value in the 
detection of intentional feigning of emotional distress 
through human figure drawings. 
Malingering and Deception Detection 
 As noted above, deception is not a foreign practice to 
individuals. In fact, many are likely to have experience with 
malingering as well since, by definition, malingering can be 
as simple as a child claiming illness to avoid taking a test at 
school. It can also be as complicated as an alleged criminal 
claiming mental illness to avoid a criminal conviction. How-
ever, there currently exists little empirical research on malin-
gering in forensic contexts among adolescents and young 
adults, particularly when projective tests are used (Rogers, 
Hinds, & Sewell, 1996), with most models of adolescent 
malingering based on clinical reports (McCann, 1998). 
Moreover, although one might argue that projective tests are 
difficult to malinger, due to a lack of transparency, it is not 
clear whether younger individuals are capable of doing so. 
Hence, the current studies provide novel data on the impact 
on the quantitative global scores when naïve participants 
attempt to dissimulate on a projective measure. 
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 Clinical settings do not appear to be immune to attempts 
at intentional feigning, and researchers’ best estimate for the 
prevalence rate of malingering psychopathology is approxi-
mately 15.7%, among adolescents in forensic practice 
(Rogers et al., 1996). Moreover, most individuals are likely 
to be aware of the potential for material gain following trau-
matic injury. Indeed, the DSM recognizes that, by definition, 
some disorders practically invite individuals to deliberately 
misrepresent themselves in assessment settings for their own 
gain, particularly post-traumatic disorders (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994). Lawsuits in such cases (e.g., 
suits alleging trauma following a motor vehicle accident) 
arguably often entail the exaggeration of cognitive impair-
ments or emotional distress in the pursuit of financial com-
pensation, leading to numerous pejorative terms for post-
traumatic symptomatology (e.g., compensationitis; etc., Res-
nick, 1997).  
 The current research examined the effectiveness of ado-
lescents and young adults to malinger when asked to feign 
such post-traumatic symptoms following a motor vehicle 
accident (MVA). These individuals are of particular interest, 
as they tend to be the group most frequently involved in 
MVAs (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
2001). Given appropriate circumstances, such individuals 
might experience the temptation (or parental or financial 
pressure) to feign post-traumatic symptoms in a forensic 
assessment. Previous findings indicate that young adults are 
capable of dissimulating trauma following an imagined 
MVA on a standardized measure – the Trauma Symptom 
Inventory (Carmody & Crossman, 2005). However, on aver-
age, their deception tended to be detectable, though not com-
pletely so. If an examiner instead introduced a DAP task to 
facilitate a patient’s recollection of a traumatic memory, it is 
not clear whether malingering would be more or less detect-
able on this projective measure. Hence, the means by which 
participants attempt to malinger emotional distress on a pro-
jective DAP task were explored.  
The Current Research 
 Overall, there were two primary goals of the present re-
search. The first was to contribute to the sparse empirical 
literature on deception and malingering in psychological 
testing, particularly among adolescents and young adults. 
Specifically, the goal was to determine whether these young 
participants would be capable of fabricating emotional dis-
tress in their human figure drawings and, if so, in what way. 
It was anticipated that participants would be able to feign 
emotional distress on human figure drawings. The second 
goal was to examine the vulnerability of the projective DAP 
task to malingering and explore whether the DAP objective 
scoring systems might have the potential to detect malinger-
ing. Two experiments were conducted with college and high 
school students to explore these issues. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were 62 undergraduate col-
lege students from introductory psychology classes volun-
teering in exchange for course credit. The sample was 53% 
female (n = 32), with an age range of 18-22 years (M = 18.92 
years, SD = 1.26) and was widely representative in terms of 
SES (ranging from low to high SES) and race/ethnicity. Eth-
nic distribution of the participants was 16% African Ameri-
can, 10% Asian American, 45% Caucasian, and 29% Latin 
American. One female participant was excluded due to fail-
ure to draw two figures. The study was approved by the In-
stitutional Review Board at the undergraduate college where 
data were collected. 
Procedure 
 Participants signed informed consent, provided demo-
graphic information (i.e., age, gender, and ethnic identity), 
and then were asked to draw figures. In the honest condition, 
standard instructions were followed. That is, participants 
drew the three figures: man, woman, and self, for a maxi-
mum time of five minutes per figure. Participants were in-
structed to draw complete figures and to draw the best fig-
ures possible. Next, a scenario was read to participants to 
begin the malingering phase of the study: 
 Suppose you were involved in a motor vehicle accident. 
Your friends inform you that you may gain a large sum of 
money if you claim psychological distress. You begin to 
claim that you have many disturbing symptoms. When you 
go for an evaluation, the interviewer asks you to draw human 
figures. Draw the figures as if you are claiming distress as a 
result of the motor vehicle accident. 
 After hearing the scenario, participants were asked to 
draw the figures again (i.e., man, woman, and self) as if they 
were claiming distress due to the accident. Overall, each 
individual drew a total of 6 figures. Use of the same partici-
pants in both conditions allowed for control of basic artistic 
abilities and of intelligence between participants (Handler, 
1984; Sims et al., 1983). Testing was conducted in small 
groups of 2-5 participants, and all responses were anony-
mous. 
Rater Training and General Scoring  
 Prior to scoring the study drawings, the judge completed 
the training sections of the Examiner’s Manual, which re-
quired learning the scoring system, scoring practice draw-
ings, and then completing a competency examination of a 
new set of drawings that required a minimum competency of 
90% correct. All 372 figures were scored for the 64 items on 
the cognitive assessment and the 55 items on the emotional 
disturbance assessment, as described below. Scoring was 
completed by a judge who was not blind to the conditions. 
Although this may be of concern with a subjective scoring 
system, there is evidence that knowledge of the status of 
patients might not affect the objective scoring system of the 
DAP:SPED (Bruening, Wagner, & Johnson, 1997).  
Scoring – Cognitive Scores 
 Drawings were scored using Naglieri’s (1988) Quantita-
tive Scoring System (QSS), which arguably serves as a valid 
and reliable measure of nonverbal cognitive ability (Wil-
liams, Fall, Eaves, & Woods-Groves, 2006). The three major 
components of the QSS scoring system are criteria, catego-
ries, and items. The 14 criteria include body parts and 
placement of the parts in relation to others. Four categories 
for all criteria are presence, detail, proportion, and a bonus. 
A total of 64 items are scored for completion and the sum of 
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the 64 items yields an overall score for each figure drawn. 
Using the test manual, these scores were converted to stan-
dard scores, according to chronological age, for further 
analyses. Higher scores on the QSS indicate higher cognitive 
abilities. 
 Naglieri’s (1988) norms for the QSS were based on a 
geographically and ethnically representative standardization 
sample of 5-17-year-olds. Coefficient alphas for the 14 crite-
ria on all three drawings ranged from .83 to .89 (for one-year 
age groups). Reliability coefficients for the individual draw-
ings of man, woman, and self were lower, ranging from .56 
to .78, with a median coefficient of .80. Interrater reliability 
for items was .91 to .94 and for overall scores, was .92 to 
.95. Concurrent validity of the DAP:QSS with cognitive abil-
ity was assessed using the Matrix Analogies Test - Short 
Form (MAT-SF). Correlations were .29 to .31 for younger 
children (grades K to 3) and .19 to .27 for older children 
(grades 4 to 12).  
Scoring – Emotional Disturbance Scores 
 Drawings also were scored using the Screening Proce-
dure for Emotional Disturbance (SPED; Naglieri et al., 
1991). The two major components of the scoring system for 
the SPED are figure dimensions and figure content. Figure 
dimensions include figure size and placement on the page (9 
scores) and figure content refers to details of the drawings 
(46 details scored as present or absent). The sum of the 55 
ratings yields an overall score for each drawing. The raw 
scores for the three drawings by each participant were 
summed to yield a total score. Using the test manual, these 
scores were converted to standard scores, according to 
chronological age and gender, for further analyses. Higher 
scores on the SPED indicate higher levels of emotional 
disturbance. 
 Naglieri et al.’s (1991) norms for the SPED were based 
on a geographically and ethnically representative standardi-
zation sample of 5-17-year-olds. Coefficient alphas for stan-
dard scores ranged from .67 to .78 (for gender and age 
groups). Test-retest correlation of standard scores was .67, 
interrater reliability was .84, and intrarater reliability was 
.83. In this study, as well as in Experiment 2, aggregate 
scores for both the DAP:QSS and DAP:SPED were used, as 
they tend to represent the strongest advantage offered by the 
objective scoring system (Riethmiller & Handler, 1997). 
Results 
 A preliminary multivariate analysis of variance (MA-
NOVA) was used to determine if there were differences in 
scores for the figures of man, woman, and self. There were 
no significant differences among the figure drawings in the 
emotional disturbance or cognitive scores in the honest and 
malinger conditions, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.99, F (4, 736) = 
.15, ns, eta squared = .001. Therefore, further analyses used 
the total scores, composed of the combined scores of man, 
woman, and self, for the emotional disturbance and cognitive 
scoring systems. 
 Table 1 presents the means of the total cognitive and total 
emotional scores for the honest and malinger instructional 
conditions. A repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed on the cognitive scores, with con-
dition (honest vs. malinger) as a within-subjects variable and 
gender as a between-subjects factor. As shown in Table 1, 
there was a significant main effect for condition, which re-
flected higher scores in the honest condition than in the ma-
linger condition. A repeated measures ANOVA on the emo-
tional disturbance scores, with condition (honest vs. malin-
ger) as a within-subjects variable and gender as a between-
subjects factor, revealed an effect for condition, with higher 
scores in the malinger condition than in the honest condition.  
 As shown in Table 1, there were no gender differences in 
either total cognitive scores or total emotional disturbance 
scores and no significant interactions between condition and 
gender. 
Discussion 
 Under instructions to malinger distress, students drew 
figures that led to higher scores of emotional disturbance and 
lower scores of cognitive ability. This suggested that perhaps 
the participants were attempting to fake distress, in part, by 
“dumbing down” their drawings. However, in considering 
possible alternatives, it became clear that some of the par-
ticipants had rushed their drawings, spending less than the 
full 5 minutes in drawing the best figures possible. This 
raised the possibility that the findings were related to the 
motivational level of the participants, rather than to the ma-
lingering instructions. Hence, a replication of the study was 
conducted to determine whether increased attention to the 
task would alter performance. In addition, a younger sample 
of participants was included to determine if the findings also 
occur among adolescents. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants 
 Two samples of individuals were included in this study. 
Sample 1 consisted of 66 undergraduate college students 
from introductory psychology classes volunteering in ex-
change for course credit. The sample was 58% female (n = 
38), with an age range of 18-22 years (M = 19.23 years; SD 
= 1.19), and was widely representative in terms of SES 
(ranging from low to high SES) and race/ethnicity. Partici-
pants in this sample were 30% African American, 10% 
Asian American, 21% Caucasian, 33% Latin American, and 
6% mixed ethnicity. One female participant was excluded 
due to failure to draw one figure. The study was approved by 
the Institutional Review Board at the undergraduate college 
at which data were collected. 
 Sample 2 consisted of 40 high school students. The sam-
ple was 62% female (n = 25), with an age range of 14-17 
years (M = 16.00 years; SD = 0.78). Participants in this sam-
ple were 18% African American, 5% Asian American, 28% 
Caucasian, 35% Latin American, and 14% mixed ethnicity. 
Students were recruited based on their voluntary responses to 
a letter offering the students an opportunity to participate in a 
psychological study. There were no financial rewards and the 
data were collected during a homeroom period. 
Procedure 
 The procedure and figure scoring were identical to those 
used in Experiment 1, with a few minor exceptions. First, in 
order for the undergraduate participants to receive credit for 
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participation in the experiment, they were required to com-
plete a debriefing form indicating their knowledge of the 
purpose of the study, the manipulation involved, the data 
collected, and the task they were to perform. Students who 
refused to participate and those who did not complete the 
debriefing form were not included in the sample. 
 Second, the younger sample of students signed assent 
forms and their parents and the high school administrator(s) 
signed informed consent forms. In addition, for this sample, 
the test was administered in 50-minute sessions to groups of 
12 to 15 students during a homeroom period. Finally, in both 
the college and high school samples, participants were in-
structed to draw each human figure for the entire five-minute 
interval. The resulting 636 figures were scored for emotional 
disturbance and cognitive ability as described in Experiment 
1. Scoring was conducted by judges who were not blind to 
the conditions (Bruening et al., 1997), but had completed the 
training reliably, as described in Experiment 1. 
Results 
 A preliminary MANOVA was used to determine if there 
were differences in scores for the figures of man, woman, 
and self. There were no significant differences as a function 
of figure in the emotional disturbance or cognitive scores in 
the honest and malinger conditions, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.98, 
F(4, 1258) = 2.04, ns, eta squared = .01. Therefore, further 
analyses used the total scores, composed of the combined 
scores of man, woman, and self, for the emotional distur-
bance and cognitive scoring systems. 
 Table 2 presents the means of the total cognitive scores 
and total emotional scores for the honest and malinger in-
structional conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the cognitive scores, with condition (honest vs. 
malinger) as a within-subjects variable and gender and age 
group (high school vs. college) as between-subjects factors. 
As shown in Table 2, there was a significant main effect for 
condition, reflecting higher cognitive ability scores in the 
honest condition than in the malinger condition. There were 
no gender differences (see Table 2) and no age group differ-
ences in total cognitive scores between high school (M = 
133.26, SE= 3.17, 95% CI = 126.98 to 139.54) and college 
students (M = 134.62, SE = 2.41, 95% CI = 129.83 to 
139.41), F(1, 102) = .12, ns, eta-squared = .00. Also, the 
interaction between condition and gender was not signifi-
cant. 
 However, there was a significant interaction between age 
group and condition F(1, 102) = 10.71, p < .001, eta-squared 
= .10. To investigate this interaction, change scores were 
calculated for cognitive scores; the change scores were ob-
tained for each participant from the honest condition to the 
malinger condition. An independent samples t-test found 
greater changes in cognitive scores for high school students 
(M = 22.42, SE = 3.25) than for college students (M = 10.39, 
SE = 2.00), t(104) = 3.33, p < .001. Fig. (1) illustrates the 
cognitive scores as a function of condition, gender, and age 
group. 
 Similarly, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
on the emotional disturbance scores, with condition as a 
within-subjects variable and gender and age group as be-
tween-subjects factors. As shown in Table 2, there was a 
significant main effect for condition, with higher emotional 
disturbance scores in the malinger condition than in the hon-
est condition. There were no gender and no age group differ-
ences in total emotional disturbance scores, and the interac-
tion between condition and gender was not significant. 
 However, the main effect of instructions on emotional 
disturbance scores was qualified by significant interactions 
between condition and gender, F(1, 102) = 4.72, p < .05, eta-
squared = .04, and between condition and age group, F(1, 
Table 1. Draw-A-Person Scores by Instructions and Gender, Experiment 1 
Scores Instructions    
 
Honest 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
Malinger 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
F value 
(1, 60) 
P level ES 
Cognitive 
120.02 (2.48) 
115.06, 124.98 
93.43 (2.86) 
87.73, 99.17 
65.88 < .001 .52 
Emotional 
8.00 (0 .48) 
7.04, 8.95 
10.46 (0.54) 
9.39, 11.54 
28.34 < .001 .32 
Scores Gender    
 
Females 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
Males 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
F value 
(1, 60) 
P level ES 
Cognitive 
105.47 (2.90) 
99.68, 111.26 
108.00 (3.09) 
101.82, 114.18 
0.36 ns .01 
Emotional 
9.28 (0 .62) 
8.05, 10.52 
9.17 (0 .66) 
7.86, 10.49 
0.10 ns .00 
ES: Eta-squared effect size. 
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102) = 5.91, p < .05, eta-squared = .06. No other results were 
significant. To investigate the interactions, change scores 
were calculated for emotional scores; the change scores were 
obtained for each participant from the honest condition to the 
malinger condition. Independent samples t-tests found 
greater changes in emotional scores for males (M = 5.58, SE 
= .80) than females (M = 3.57, SE = .75), and greater change 
scores for high school (M = 5.87, SE = 1.15) than for college 
students (M = 3.48, SE = .54). Fig. (2) illustrates the emo-
tional disturbance scores as a function of condition, gender, 
and age group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (1). Cognitive scores on the Draw-A-Person test as a function 
of condition, gender, and age group. Higher scores indicate greater 
cognitive abilities. 
 
 It is possible that the change in emotional disturbance 
scores from the honest condition to the malinger condition is 
attributable to the concurrent change in cognitive scores.
1
 To 
examine this possibility, a repeated measures analysis of 
covariance was conducted on the emotional disturbance 
scores, using the change in cognitive scores as a covariate, 
with condition as a within-subjects factor and gender and age 
group as between-subjects factors. There was a main effect 
of condition, F(1, 101) = 13.55, p < .001, eta-squared = .12, 
with higher scores in the malinger condition (M = 19.34, SE 
= .70, 95% CI = 17.95 to 20.74) than in the honest condition 
(M = 14.68, SE = .57, 95% CI = 13.55 to 15.80). In addition, 
there were significant differences in scores between high 
school (M = 21.95, SE = .96, 95% CI = 20.05 to 23.85) and 
college students (M = 12.07, SD = .72, 95% CI = 10.65 to 
13.49), F(1, 101) = 65.42, p < .001, eta-squared = .39. No 
other results were significant. Therefore, the increases in 
emotional disturbance scores from the honest condition to 
the malinger condition are not attributable to the correspond-
ing change in cognitive scores. 
                                                
1 Thank you to Kang Lee for pointing out this possibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (2). Emotional disturbance scores on the Draw-A-Person test 
as a function of condition, gender, and age group. Higher scores 
indicate greater emotional disturbance. 
Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, participants demonstrated the ability 
to malinger distress on the DAP task, but they concurrently 
decreased their cognitive scores on the task in doing so. This 
suggests a potential role for objective cognitive scores in the 
assessment of malingering on DAP tests. Such malingering 
is clearly within the capacity of even high school students, 
yet these younger participants were especially likely to feign 
with lowered cognitive scores, reinforcing this tendency as a 
possible signal to malingering attempts. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The current research contributes to the literature on de-
ception and malingering in the context of a projective psy-
chological evaluation. Specifically, the goals of the research 
were to examine whether participants would be able to feign 
emotional distress on human figure drawings and whether 
the use of two objective scoring systems might eventually 
assist in determining when participants were malingering 
distress on DAP projective tests. Results from both high 
school and college student samples suggest that adolescents 
and young adults are capable of feigning distress on the task. 
However, their technique, as detected by the Naglieri scoring 
system, seems to involve drawing figures that are more 
primitive than they are capable of drawing. Of course, the 
tactics chosen by the participants in this study may differ 
from those used by individuals to feign trauma in a forensic 
setting. Hence, future research might investigate the useful-
ness of the cognitive ability scale in detecting deceptive re-
sponding. 
 Three methods used to interpret drawings are typically 
identified (Lally, 2001). First, clinicians and researchers use 
their global qualitative impression to arrive at conclusions 
about the artist’s personality characteristics and level of pa-
thology. This widely used method involves little or no for-
mal scoring, and the interpreter relies on their phenomenol-
ogical experience of the drawing, affective or visceral reac-
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tions to it, and loosely reigned impressions and associations. 
Other methods link single signs with specific aspects of per-
sonality or specific diagnoses, and the third type of method 
focuses on the frequency of indicators of pathology in a 
drawing. A comparison is made between the number of such 
items in a drawing and normative information about the ex-
pected frequency and conclusions are then drawn about the 
presence of maladjustment (e.g., Koppitz, 1968; DAP:SPED, 
Naglieri et al., 1991; Van Hutton, 1994). Given the variabil-
ity of method of use, and lack of sufficient validation of the 
various methods, it has been argued that the use of such tests 
in forensic settings is premature (Lally, 2001). Such a deter-
mination rests on both legal standards for evidentiary admis-
sibility and psychometric criteria. Currently, controversy 
exists over the use of draw-a-person tests in general. For 
example, Lilienfeld, Wood, and Garb (2000) indicated that 
there are currently no reliable scoring systems for DAP, with 
the exception of Naglieri’s system, which showed some 
promise. Indeed, use, interpretation, and acceptance of DAP 
tests is not uniform. 
 The current research raises additional questions about the 
use of the DAP task, which was vulnerable to malingering 
by adolescents and young adults. This is consistent with pre-
vious findings that, even before adolescence, individuals 
become accomplished (and frequent) liars and that their 
skills include the ability to malinger (Amini, Talwar, & 
Crossman, 2010; Carmody & Crossman, 2005; Crossman & 
Lewis, 2006). Given that adolescents and young adults are 
the group most likely to suffer MVAs, the current results 
could have important implications for understanding their 
potential for feigning reactions to MVAs. 
 However, the findings also suggest that DAP malingerers 
(at least at these ages) might have a “tell” – their cognitive 
ability scores. Although this study lacked an independent 
measure of participants’ cognitive ability, such a measure 
might be a promising avenue for future investigation of 
means for detecting malingering (Salekin, Kubak, & Lee, 
2008). Instances where the estimates of cognitive ability 
based on the drawing scores are much lower than those on an 
independent cognitive assessment might raise red flags for 
an interviewer. This might be a particularly useful compari-
son, as some research suggests DAP tests are more accurate 
at determining the artist’s developmental level or cognitive 
ability than at detecting emotional disturbance (ter Laak, de 
Goede, Aleva, & van Rijswijk, 2005). This is not to suggest 
that the DAP should be used alone for assessments. Because 
feigned cognitive impairments are a source of concern as 
well, especially when litigation is involved, use of objective 
cognitive tests with components to assess malingering seems 
appropriate (Salekin et al., 2008). Clinicians have available 
and make use of a variety of such tools and skills for this 
task, but by thoroughly examining the validity and reliability 
of each, researchers can help to enhance the overall useful-
ness of available measures. 
 Malingering in the current research was not a high stakes 
exercise for the participants or for the raters and the conse-
quences of failure were not severe. Nevertheless, individuals 
managed to significantly influence their scores for imagined 
distress in an artificial, laboratory setting. In addition, raters 
were not blind to condition in the current studies. Yet, previ-
ous research has shown that raters’ knowledge of abuse 
status of patients did not affect the application of the objec-
tive DAP:SPED scoring system (Bruening et al., 1997). 
Hence, it seems reasonable to suggest that raters’ knowledge 
of honest and malinger conditions for the drawings in this 
study are unlikely to have influenced application of the ob-
jective scoring systems. Instead, the unanticipated diver-
gence of cognitive and emotional disturbance scores sug-
gests that the trend reflected a strategy, consciously or not, 
relied upon by malingerers in accomplishing their task. 
Table 2. Draw-A-Person Scores by Instructions and Gender, Experiment 2 
Scores Instructions    
 
Honest 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
Malinger 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
F value 
(1, 102) 
P level ES 
Cognitive 
142.45 (2.34) 
137.82, 147.09 
125.43 (2.04) 
121.39, 129.47 
86.34 < .001 .46 
Emotional 
14.50 (0 .57) 
13.39, 15.62 
17.85 (0.69) 
16.50, 19.20 
75.23 < .001 .42 
Scores Gender    
 
Females 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
Males 
M (SE) 
95% CI 
F value 
(1, 102) 
P level ES 
Cognitive 
134.94 (2.50) 
129.99, 139.89 
132.94 (3.10) 
126.79, 139.10 
0.25 ns .00 
Emotional 
9.28 (0 .62) 
8.05, 10.52 
9.17 (0 .66) 
7.86, 10.49 
0.10 ns .00 
ES: Eta-squared effect size. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 Overall, this analysis makes clear the need for great cau-
tion in the use and application of DAP projective testing. In 
the limited pursuit of rapport-building with clients, it might 
have some clear advantages over various other clinical tech-
niques. The DAP task might allow patients to express them-
selves non-verbally in relatively unthreatening ways (Rieth-
miller & Handler, 1997). Alternatively, its use late in an in-
terview to jog additional memory, as suggested by Aldridge 
et al. (2004), could be beneficial. However, consistent with 
data on relatively conservative rates of administration 
(Archer, Buffington-Vollum, Stredny & Handel, 2006), the 
use of drawing as a diagnostic or forensic tool is currently 
questionable, particularly given sparse, but clear, informa-
tion regarding the potential for malingering on such a meas-
ure. 
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